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To protect in-state businesses from out-of-state competition,
several states have enacted local preference statutes. These stat-
utes require that a state's towns, cities or other subdivisions favor
in-state businesses when they make certain purchases and sales.'
For example, Alaska requires schools receiving state funds to buy
Alaskan agricultural products unless the products are more than
seven percent more expensive than equivalent products from out-
of-state.2 Not surprisingly, out-of-state businesses unable to sell
products to towns and cities in states with such local preference
statutes feel discriminated against; they complain that such stat-
utes violate the dormant Commerce Clause.$
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a state can im-
pose a local preference on its subdivisions. A state cannot impose a
local preference on private parties." But the state may prefer in-
state businesses-so long as it acts as a "market participant."5 A
t B.A. 1990, Harvard College; J.D. Candidate 1994, The University of Chicago.
I By enacting a "preference statute," a political entity commits itself to prefer its own
residents when making sales or purchases. By contrast, "local preference statutes" impose
resident preferences on a state's political subdivisions.
I See Alaska Stat § 36.15.050 (Michie 1992).
3 See Hughes v Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 US 794, 802, 804-05 (1976).
4 See Wyoming v Oklahoma, 112 S Ct 789, 800-02 (1992) (rejecting an Oklahoma stat-
ute requiring that private electric utilities purchase at least 10% Oklahoma-mined coal).
' See South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v Wunnicke, 467 US 82, 93-95 (1984)
(summarizing cases). As the Court noted, "if a State is acting as a market participant, rather
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state acts as a market participant when it buys and sells goods and
thereby takes on attributes of a private business.' In such cases, a
state may freely "determine those with whom it will deal, and [] fix
the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed
purchases."'7 Acting as market participants, states have, for exam-
ple, made it more lucrative to sell scrap autos to in-state than to
out-of-state processors8 and forced out-of-state customers for
state-produced cement to wait until all in-state buyers were
satisfied.9
Lower courts currently disagree over whether local preference
statutes should be treated as instances of market participation or
as instances of states impermissibly imposing a preference on au-
tonomous entities. The Seventh Circuit voided an Illinois law re-
quiring contractors on any public works project to hire only Illinois
laborers,10 but the Third and Ninth Circuits have upheld similarly-
structured laws as forms of market participation."
This disagreement reflects an uncertainty about the market
participant exception itself. Current doctrine offers little direction
to courts that must apply the exception. The Supreme Court has
not yet identified criteria which reliably identify when states are
acting as market participants. Lacking such criteria, courts often
look to the "market participant" label itself for guidance. But the
label is misleading; it does not adequately describe the dimensions
of the exception.
This Comment offers a pragmatic conception of the market
participant exception: state exemption from dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny should be limited to those actions available to a
private party in the marketplace. Such a limitation denies states
the means to regulate in a discriminatory way. Every private party
acting in the marketplace faces, at a minimum, two constraints: 1)
it cannot regulate 2 and 2) it is subject to the antitrust laws.' 3 If a
state is neither regulating nor taking action that would violate the
than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activi-
ties." Id at 93.
' Reeves, Inc. v Stake, 447 US 429, 439 n 12 (1980).
' Id, quoting Perkins v Lukens Steel Co., 310 US 113, 127 (1940).
8 Hughes, 426 US at 799-801.
Reeves, 447 US at 432-33 (sales from a state-owned and operated cement factory).
10 W.C.M. Window Co., Inc. v Bernardi, 730 F2d 486, 496 (7th Cir 1984).
Trojan Technologies, Inc. v Pennsylvania, 916 F2d 903, 912 (3d Cir 1990), cert de-
nied, 111 S Ct 28'14 (1991); Big Country Foods, Inc. v Board of Education of Anchorage
School District, 952 F2d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir 1992).
12 The term "regulate" is used to convey a state's power to impose rules on the conduct
of private parties with whom the state has no contractual relation.
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antitrust laws if carried out by a private party, then the state's
action will not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
Under this "private-party" test, whether a local preference
statute is constitutional will depend on the relationship between a
state and its subdivisions. A private party may adopt a preference
itself but may not impose the preference on other actors either by
regulating or by exploiting its market power in violation of the an-
titrust laws. Under the private-party conception, then, if the state
and its subdivisions are independent entities, a state-imposed pref-
erence may become an instance of market regulation.14 But where,
as a matter of state law, a state and its subdivisions must be
deemed the same actor, a preference statute should be seen as an
example of market participation, exempt from the restrictions of
the dormant Commerce Clause.
Section I of this Comment describes the sweep of local prefer-
ence laws and their unsettled status under the market participant
exception. Section II presents and justifies the private-party defini-
tion of "market participation." Section IH applies the private-
party test to local preference statutes, in the process revisiting the
decisions of the Courts of Appeals. This analysis indicates that lo-
cal preference statutes are not per se unconstitutional.
IS The "private party" used for comparison purposes in this Comment is subject to the
antitrust laws even though private parties are, in some instances, immune from antitrust.
See, for example, U.S. v Citizens and Southern National Bank, 422 US 86, 111-12 (1975)
(discussing banks' exemption from antitrust); Connell Construction Co. v Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 US 616, 621-23 (1975) (scope of trade union anti-
trust exemption); Flood v Kuhn, 407 US 258, 284-86 (1972) (baseball held exempt from
antitrust). Such exemptions reflect determinations that antitrust scrutiny is inappropriate.
But no such determination exists here. Indeed, courts have justified the Commerce Clause
immunity of the market participant exception by arguing that antitrust laws will apply to
states acting as market participants. See, for example, Wunnicke, 467 US at 98-99, and text
accompanying notes 84-87.
14 See Wyoming, 112 S Ct at 802-03 (suggesting that Oklahoma's restrictions on the use
of out-of-state coal would not have violated the dormant Commerce Clause if the restric-
tions had applied only to state-owned facilities and not to private facilities); Charles County
v Stevens, 299 Md 203, 472 A2d 12, 19 (1984) (policy allowing only waste generated by
county residents to be dumped in county landfill falls within the market participant excep-
tion; the policy "does not restrict the disposal of [out-of-state] waste in any other landfill
that might be constructed within the County").
1993]
The University of Chicago Law Review [60:615
I. LOCAL PREFERENCE STATUTES AND THE MARKET PARTICIPANT
EXCEPTION
A. Local Preference Statutes
States use a wide variety of mechanisms to further their in-
state preferences. 15 A 1992 survey found only six states that ap-
plied no formal resident preference.1 " Most commonly, states use
local preferences in "tie-bid" situations: when an in-state and out-
of-state resident each submit bids at equal cost, the state awards
the contract to the resident.17 States may also impose a percentage
preference: when comparing contract bids, the state discounts the
price of in-state bids by a set percentage.18 Other states apply re-
ciprocal preferences which handicap out-of-state bidders to the
same extent that their own states prefer local bidders."9
B. Existing Doctrine: The Market Participant Exception
The market participant exception reflects the Supreme
Court's desire to protect states' autonomy, 0 even at some cost to
the national economy.21 At the same time, the Court has taken
steps to keep the market participant exception from swallowing
the dormant Commerce Clause rule.
15 See Comment, In-State Preferences in Public Contracting: States' Rights versus Ec-
onomic Sectionalism, 49 U Colo L Rev 205, 205-208 (1978) (surveying statutes).
16 The no-preference states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, and
Washington. National Association of State Purchasing Officials, 1992 Survey, Table 43: In
State Preference Laws (1992) (on file with U Chi L Rev) ("NASPO Survey"). But note that
whether by formal or informal means, all states prefer their residents under at least some
circumstances. National Institute of Government Purchasing, Inc., 1991 Survey of In-State
(Buy-Local), Buy-American, & Recycled Product Preferences 1-5 (1992) (on file with U Chi
L Rev).
17 Forty-one states have enacted statutes requiring this practice. NASPO Survey, Table
43 (cited in note 16).
18 The NASPO Survey found 10 states which apply a percentage preference to in-state
bidders. Id. See, for example, Hawaii Rev Stat § 103-43 (1985); La Rev Stat Ann
§§ 38:2251.1-2, 2255 (West 1989 & Supp 1993); Mont Code Ann §§ 18-1-101 through 18-1-
103 (1987).
19 See, for example, Ga Code Ann § 50-5-60 (Michie 1990); ND Cent Code § 44-08-01
(Supp 1991); Okla Stat § 61-14 (1989). Fourteen states had reciprocal preference statutes in
place in 1978. Comment, 49 U Colo L Rev at 208 (cited in note 15).
11 Reeves, 447 US at 438 ("Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of
state sovereignty ... .") (citations omitted).
21 Id at 454 (Powell dissenting) ("The creation of a free national economy was a major
goal of the States when they resolved to unite under the Federal Constitution."); H.P. Hood
& Sons, Inc. v Du Mond, 336 US 525, 539 (1949).
Market Participant Exception
1. An exception for market participants.
The dormant Commerce Clause bars states from advancing
"their own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of ar-
ticles of commerce, either into or out of the state .... "-22 Regard-
less of a state's ultimate purpose, it may not discriminate "against
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.
23
State regulations that achieve or aim toward simple economic pro-
tectionism face a "virtually per se rule of invalidity.
24
Despite this rule against protectionism, the Supreme Court
held in Hughes v Alexandria Scrap, Inc.25 that "[n]othing in the
purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State .. .
from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor
its own citizens over others." The Hughes Court upheld a Mary-
land law which made it harder for out-of-state companies to par-
ticipate in a program offering bounties for the disposal of scrap
autos.26 Four years later, in Reeves, Inc. v Stake,2 7 the Court found
that South Dakota acted as a market participant in giving its resi-
dents a priority in sales from a state-owned and operated cement
factory. Similarly, the Court in White v Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers, Inc.2 upheld the Boston mayor's order
that all the city's public works contractors employ at least fifty
percent local residents.
11 H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 US at 535. The Commerce Clause provides that Congress
shall have power to regulate commerce among the several states. US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3.
Dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on the states "appear nowhere in the words of the
Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of [the Supreme] Court giv-
ing effect to its basic purpose." Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617, 623 (1978).
23 Philadelphia, 437 US at 626-27. See also New Energy Company of Indiana v
Limbach, 486 US 269, 274 (1988) ("state statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate
commerce are routinely struck down... unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified
by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism") (citations omitted).
For an example of sufficient justification, see Maine v Taylor, 477 US 131, 151-52
(1986) (ban on import of live baitfish due to otherwise unavoidable threat of parasites). For
inadequate justifications, see Dean Milk Co. v Madison, 340 US 349, 356 (1951) (municipal
ordinance discriminating against out-of-state producers; intended to maintain milk quality),
and Baldwin v G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 US 511, 522-23 (1935) (imposition of price floor for
out-of-state milk producers intended to maintain "a regular and adequate supply of pure
and wholesome milk").
Philadelphia, 437 US at 624.
2 426 US 794, 810 (1976).
21 Id at 800-02, 814.
27 447 US 429, 432-33, 440, 446-47 (1980).
29 460 US 204, 205-206, 214-15 (1983).
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In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v Wunnicke 2 9
however, a plurality of the Court rejected an Alaska requirement
that any timber taken from state lands be processed within the
state prior to export. According to the Court, Alaska could not use
its leverage in the timber market "to exert a regulatory effect in
the processing market, in which it is not a participant."30 Other-
wise, the market participant exception would simply swallow the
rule that "[s]tates may not impose substantial burdens on inter-
state commerce even if they act with the permissible state purpose
of fostering local industry. 3
1
2. The difficulty of identifying "market participants."
While the term "market participation" provides a distinctive
label for the Commerce Clause immunity set forth in Hughes, the
label is unhelpful. The Supreme Court has itself struggled to treat
successive cases consistently, appearing to rely as much on its
evolving "intuition" as on any concrete standard. 2 Notably, each
author of the Court's market participant opinions dissented in the
next.3 As a result, courts and commentators continue to search for
the precise contours of the market participant exception.3
While the Supreme Court ostensibly relies on a distinction be-
tween impermissible "regulation" and permissible "participa-
tion,"3 5 this distinction is purely formal and, alone, provides little
practical guidance to lower courts. Moreover, the Court has not
provided criteria which lower courts could use to distinguish regu-
lation from participation. For example, in New Energy Company
29 467 US 82, 84, 99 (1984) (White, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, with
Burger and Powell concurring in the judgment).
30 Id at 98.
31 Id. As Professor Manheim has observed, "[l]est it become too powerful, the allegory
of the state as private trader necessarily spawns exceptions, such as the state as monopo-
list." Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 Ariz St
L J 559, 608 (1990) (citations omitted).
See Wunnicke, 467 US at 98.
" See Reeves, 447 US at 447 (Powell, author of Hughes majority opinion, dissenting);
White, 460 US at 215 (Blackmun, author of Reeves, dissenting); Wunnicke, 467 US at 101
(Rehnquist, author of White, dissenting). Observers have pointed to this pattern as evidence
of the unsettled nature of the exception. See, for example, Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v
Lycoming County, 883 F2d 245, 249 (3d Cir 1989).
3 See Swin Resource Systems, 883 F2d at 251 (describing the distinction between im-
proper regulation and permissible market participation as "problematic"). See also Teresa
Gillen, A Proposed Model of the Sovereign/Proprietary Distinction, 133 U Pa L Rev 661,
662 (1985).
Wunnicke, 467 US at 93-95.
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of Indiana v Limbach,36 the Court did not classify an Ohio tax
credit scheme as market participation since taxation is a "prime-
val" governmental activity. But the Court gave no reason why state
spending is any less primeval than state taxation (which is presum-
ably undertaken to support state spending). Frustration with such
criteria has led numerous observers to question whether any mean-
ingful differences between states as regulators and as market par-
ticipants do in fact exist.37 Even if state regulation and participa-
tion could be distinguished satisfactorily, the distinction is no
longer determinative. After Wunnicke, it is not enough for courts
to determine whether a state is participating in the market. Courts
must also characterize the market in which the state participates,
and ascertain whether the state's activities have any "substantial
regulatory effect[s]" beyond that market.3 8
It is not clear how a court should go about characterizing the
relevant market. For example, the court in Charles County Com-
missioners v Stevenss9 observed that a municipality which charged
a higher fee for the disposal of out-of-state waste at its dump
would be a market participant if the market were characterized as
one for waste disposal services, but a regulator if the market were
viewed as waste per se. A similar difficulty arose in Smith v Geor-
gia Department of Agriculture.40 There, the state granted Georgia
farmers a preference in leasing the prime selling areas at a state-
owned farmer's market.41 The Smith court held that the state had
36 486 US 269, 277 (1988).
37 See David Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U Pa L Rev
1309, 1322 (1989) ("the line between 'participant' and 'regulator' is notoriously difficult to
draw") (citations omitted); Note, The Foreign Commerce Clause and the Market Partici-
pant Exception, 25 Vand J Transnational L 257, 288 (1992) ("Apparently, the only remain-
ing valid distinction between Reeves and [Wunnicke] is the foreign commerce issue."); Wil-
liam L. Kovacs and Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste
Disposal Services-Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 Envir L
779, 809-10 (1988) (states are too heavily involved in regulatory activities to act as "partici-
pants"). See also Christine Hunter Kellett, The Market Participant Doctrine: No Longer
"Good Sense" or "Sound Law", 9 Temple Envir L and Tech J 169, 174 (1990) ("Beyond its
conclusions, the Court has given little guidance as to how the determination of participant
or regulator is made."); Steven G. Gey, The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 17 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 1, 64-65 (1989-90) (the Supreme Court has not ex-
plained how regulator/participant distinctions can be drawn consistently).
Wunnicke, 467 US at 97.
39 299 Md 203, 473 A2d 12, 20 (1983). See also Swin Resource Systems, 883 F2d 245.
While the majority found the relevant market to be one "for disposal services," id at 250,
Judge Gibbons, dissenting, viewed the market as one for "landfill space." Id at 259.
0 630 F2d 1081 (5th Cir 1980).
41 Id at 1082.
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regulated the market in "produce sales, 42 but the dissenting opin-
ion argued that Georgia had simply acted in the leasing market.43
Until the Supreme Court provides guidance, courts will continue to
identify relevant markets differently.44
Even if courts can properly characterize the markets in which
states participate, courts must then decide whether the states have
a "substantial regulatory effect" beyond these markets.45 Once
again, the Court has failed to offer a readily accessible basis for
making this determination.
Recently, the Court in Building and Construction Trades
Council v Associated Builders and Contractors of Massachusetts!
Rhode Island, Inc.46 observed that when a private party (the para-
digmatic proprietor) participates "in a boycott of a supplier on the
basis of a labor policy concern rather than a profit motive," the
party in fact seeks to "regulate" the target of the boycott. There-
fore, the Court reasoned, a state which employs boycott tactics in
order to affect conduct unrelated to a party's "performance of con-
tractual obligations to the State" should be deemed a regulator
rather than a market participant.47 However, this analysis ill suits
the market participant exception.
The Court has held that a state may require that its trading
partners hire at least fifty percent local workers,48 or refuse to
trade with out-of-state parties until all local customers are satis-
fied.4e To the extent that such policies resemble boycotts, they
"regulate" the conduct of the state's trading partners in the man-
ner suggested by Building Trades Council. But the Court held
these policies to be forms of market participation-not
"regulation."
For the Building Trades Council framework to apply, then, a
party's performance of her contractual obligations to the state
" Id at 1083, 1085.
3 Id at 1087 (Randall dissenting).
4 As an example of the Court's inconsistent signals, White held that states may impose
conditions beyond "the boundary of formal privity of contract"-so long as actual privity
exists. White, 460 US at 211 n 7. Yet the Wunnicke plurality suggested that Commerce
Clause restraints might arise within the boundary of formal privity and urged that the rele-
vant market be "relatively narrowly defined." 467 US at 97-98.
'5 Wunnicke, 467 US at 97.
46 1993 US LEXIS 1948, *20.
47 Id, citing Wisconsin Department of Industry v Gould, 475 US 282, 289 (1985). In
Gould, the Court held that Wisconsin's policy of "prohibiting state purchases from repeat
labor law violators" constituted regulation, not market participation. 475 US at 289.
'8 White, 460 US at 205-06.
"9 Reeves, 447 US at 432-33.
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must be more closely related to her in-state/out-of-state status
than to her compliance with various labor law concerns. It is diffi-
cult to see how this could systematically be the case. More likely,
federal labor law preemption places a stricter burden on state ac-
tion than does the dormant Commerce Clause. °
The regulatory effects prohibited by the dormant Commerce
Clause cannot be identified simply by considering the magnitude
of the burden imposed on out-of-state parties by a state's prefer-
ence statute. For example, the Reeves Court permitted South Da-
kota to give its own residents a priority in purchasing cement, even
though Reeves, Inc., an out-of-state customer, had to reduce its
own business by seventy-six percent as a result of the state's ac-
tion.5 1 That the Court upheld the South Dakota policy despite its
dramatic impact strongly suggests that the magnitude of impact
does not predict the outcome of market participant cases.
Finally, while economic theory might help identify which state
actions have "regulatory" effects, economic analysis does not seem
to explain the Supreme Court's market participant holdings.2
Even if it did, courts are generally not equipped to engage in ex-
tensive economic analysis.5
50 It may be questioned whether statutory preemption principles can properly be ap-
plied in the dormant Commerce Clause context. See Gould, 475 US at 289 (The market
participant exception "reflects the particular concerns underlying the Commerce Clause, not
any general notion regarding the necessary extent of state power in areas where Congress
has acted.").
51 447 US at 433.
51 See Barbara J. Redman, The Market Regulator-Market Participant Distinction and
Supreme Court Vigilance over Discriminatory State Programs: Does Economic Theory
Justify the Judicial Effort?, 25 Am Bus L J 585 (1988). As Redman argues, "according to
economic theory, there is little merit in maintaining the market regulator-market partici-
pant distinction." Id at 586.
53 See American Commercial Lines, Inc. v Louisville & Nashville RR Co., 392 US 571,
586 n 16 (1968) (the Court is not particularly suited to consider economic arguments). Since
economic analysis includes its own set of assumptions regarding economic efficiency, use of
this approach-even if practically feasible-risks that courts would wrongfully displace leg-
islative judgments not properly reviewed by courts. Courts have traditionally abstained from
enforcing any particular economic theory. See Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US 726, 730 (1963).
Furthermore, market participant cases often present facts which are "subtle, complex,
politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis....
[T]he adjustment of interests in this context is a task better suited for Congress .... "
Reeves, 447 US at 439. Preference statutes require states to strike a precise balance between
competing interests. States must conserve tax dollars and at the same time satisfy constitu-
ents' desires for state contracts. Graduated percentage-preference statutes demonstrate the
degree to which states fine-tune these calculations: Alaska's preferences vary between 3, 5,
and 7%; Hawaii's between 3, 5, and 10%. NASPO Survey, Table 43 (cited in note 16).
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3. Bypassing the difficulty.
The difficulties inherent in the market participant/market reg-
ulator distinction have frustrated many observers, who have sought
alternatives to the Court's ambiguous doctrine. Some commenta-
tors argue that dormant Commerce Clause cases can be resolved by
scrutinizing states' motives.5 4 The Supreme Court, however, has
expressly ignored considerations of state motive in its market par-
ticipation analysis.5 5 Some litigants have tried to avoid the Com-
merce Clause issue by challenging resident preference policies on
other constitutional grounds, including the Privileges and Immuni-
ties or Equal Protection Clauses. Such challenges have met with
mixed success. 56
Many observers have simply called for the abolition of the
market participant exception altogether. 57 Frequently, these argu-
5 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich L Rev 1091, 1206-07 (1986) (arguing that the
Court has, in fact, done no more than screen state actions for "protectionist purpose");
Note, The Market Participant Test in Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis-Protecting
Protectionism?, 1985 Duke L J 697, 732-33 (arguing that state actions motivated by eco-
nomic protectionism should not be deemed "market participation"). But see Steven Breker-
Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 69 Or L Rev 895,
909 (1990) (arguing that Regan's thesis involves the "somewhat preposterous claim that the
Justices are not aware of their own decision-making processes").
55 The Supreme Court was indifferent to concerns that South Dakota had reduced its
out-of-state cement sales "in response to political concerns that would likely be inconse-
quential to a private cement producer .... ." Reeves, 447 US at 453 (Powell dissenting).
Similarly, Justice Blackmun's argument that the preference at issue in White was simply
"parochial favoritism" did not sway the Court. 460 US at 223 (Blackmun dissenting).
56 See, for example, Salla v County of Monroe, 48 NY2d 514, 399 NE2d 909 (1979)
(challenge to New York preference statute on Privileges and Immunities, Commerce Clause,
and Equal Protection grounds). Privileges and Immunities challenges under US Const, Art
IV, § 2 have been the most successful of late. See United Building & Construction Trades
Council v Camden, 465 US 208, 221 (1984) (striking, on Privileges and Immunities grounds,
a preference provision similar to that upheld under the market participant exception in
White).
Courts do not agree, however, on the applicability of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause to local preference statutes. Compare Wyoming v Antonich, 694 P2d 60, 64 (Wyo
1985) (Wyoming Preference Act does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause) with
Salla, 399 NE2d at 910 (New York preference statute violates Privileges and Immunities
Clause); People ex rel Bernardi v Leary Const. Co., Inc., 102 Ili 2d 295, 464 NE2d 1019,
1022-23 (1984) (Privileges and Immunities violation by Illinois Preference Act). See gener-
ally Note, Hiring Preference Acts: Has the Supreme Court Rendered Them Violations of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause? 54 Fordham L Rev 271 (1985).
57 See, for example, Wunnicke, 467 US at 101 (Brennan concurring) (pointing to the
"inherent weakness of the doctrine"); Swin Resource Systems, 883 F2d at 261 (Gibbons
dissenting) ("The notion that state enterprises 'participate' in the market on the same foot-
ing as private concerns is a chimera.").
See also Breker-Cooper, 69 Or L Rev at 935 (cited in note 54) (the Court should no
longer take up Commerce Clause cases); Manheim, 22 Ariz St L J at 606, 622-23 (cited in
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ments rely on Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transportation
Authority,5 which dispensed with the governmental/proprietary
distinction in the context of state immunity from federal regula-
tion.59 However, the Court recently affirmed the use of a regulator/
proprietor distinction in analyzing the preemption of state laws by
federal regulation." And in three cases since Garcia, the Supreme
Court has recognized the continuing validity of the market partici-
pant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause."1
As a result, courts must continue to apply a market partici-
pant exception, even if unsure of its actual nature. Case law on
local preference statutes reflects this uncertainty and suggests the
need for a clearer approach to the exception.
C. Local Preference Statutes as Market Participation: W.C.M.,
Trojan, and Big Country
Three courts of appeals have considered whether local prefer-
ence statutes constitute market participation. In W.C.M. Window
Co., Inc. v Bernardi,2 the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the
note 31) (arguing that the market participant distinction is unworkable; instead, Congress
should intervene when it finds that a state law "truly jeopardizes the national interest in
free trade"); Richard S. Myers, The Burger Court and the Commerce Clause: An Evalua-
tion of the Role of State Sovereignty, 60 Notre Dame L Rev 1056, 1057 (1985) (arguing that
the Burger Court failed to revive state sovereignty in the Commerce Clause area); Jonathan
D. Varat, State, Citizenship, and Interstate Equality, 48 U Chi L Rev 487, 492-93 (1981)
(suggesting that the Court has not coped with the complexity of the task of defining the
proper scope of states' authority to favor their residents).
469 US 528 (1985). See, for example, Kellett, 9 Temple Envir L & Tech J 169 (cited
in note 37).
69 By a 5-4 margin, Garcia held that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to the San
Antonio transit authority and overruled National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833
(1976), which had reached an opposite conclusion on the grounds that the federal govern-
ment could not regulate states' "traditional governmental functions." Garcia, 469 US at
545-47.
40 See Building and Construction Trades Council v Associated Builders and Contrac-
tors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 1993 US LEXIS 1948, *17 (opinion for the unani-
mous Court notes the line of preemption decisions which "support the distinction between
government as regulator and government as proprietor").
61 Wyoming v Oklahoma, 112 S Ct 789, 802-03 (1992), citing Reeves, 447 US 429 and
Hughes, 426 US 794 ('We have recognized that the Commerce Clause does not restrict the
State's action as a free market participant."); New Energy Co. of Indiana v Limbach, 486
US 269, 277 (1988), citing Hughes; Wisconsin Department of Industry v Gould, 475 US 282,
289 (1986), citing Hughes and White, 460 US 204.
a' 730 F2d 486, 496 (7th Cir 1984) (treating ]1M Rev Stat ch 49, §§ 269-274 (1981)).
After Bernardi, the Illinois legislature passed a successor statute to the Illinois Preference
Act. The new statute, l Rev Stat ch 48, §§ 2201-07 (1986 & Supp 1992), was challenged in
turn. See E & E Construction Co. v Illinois, 674 F Supp 269 (N D MII 1987). However, no
final resolution of this case is reported.
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market participant exception to an Illinois preference law requir-
ing that all public works contracts employ only Illinois workers.
The state had exceeded its authority, Judge Posner held, since the
"preference law applies to every public construction contract in Il-
linois . . ." whether or not state-funded or administered. 3 Espe-
cially where local school boards enjoy substantial autonomy in run-
ning their affairs, "[t]he difference between the state's preferring
state residents in its own dealings and forcing local agencies to do
so in theirs is both analytical and quantitative. '6 4
By contrast, the Third Circuit held in Trojan Technologies,
Inc. v Pennsylvania6 5 that Pennsylvania acted as a market partici-
pant when it required that all its political subdivisions purchase
products containing only U.S.-made steel. The court found that
Pennsylvania's local government units "exist only through affirma-
tive acts of the state."66 Therefore, the court saw "no reason why,
attendant on making such affirmative grants of power, the Com-
monwealth may not also restrict the contracting authority of such
local bodies."67 Since Pennsylvania had displaced the purchasing
discretion of its political subdivisions, the state and its subdivi-
sions could be considered a single purchaser.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Big Country Foods, Inc. v
Board of Education of Anchorage"' upheld an Alaska statute re-
quiring that state-funded schools give a seven percent bid prefer-
ence to in-state milk suppliers. The court found that Alaska was
"simply making a decision as to what it will pay for a product
bought on the open market. ' 69 Through the preference statute,
Alaska and its subdivisions became the same "market participant."
To avoid arguments "over the extent of Alaska state control of
the local school districts," the Big Country court preemptively
held that political subdivisions are not separate from state con-
trol.7 0 The court noted that a "rule that would consider some polit-
ical subdivisions as separate from state controls would lead to diffi-
63 W.C.M., 730 F2d at 495.
" Id at 496.
65 916 F2d 903, 911 (3d Cir 1990). The preference at issue in Trojan applied to a
"broadly defined" list of public agencies, set forth in 73 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1886. Id at 905.
66 Id at 911.
67 Id.
952 F2d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir 1992) (treating Alaska Stat § 36.15.050).
09 Id at 1181.
10 Id at 1179.
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cult case-specific inquiries into the degree of subdivision
autonomy."1171
In fact, such case-specific inquiries are necessary. Otherwise,
courts run a significant risk of misapplying the market participant
exception. States' preference policies can be expected to vary from
state-to-state; this, in itself, does not raise dormant Commerce
Clause concerns.72 And as W.C.M., Trojan, and Big Country illus-
trate, the degree of autonomy of a state's subdivisions affects the
extent to which a state may extend the scope of its preference poli-
cies. Therefore, the particular features of individual states' local
government law can be expected to affect the constitutionality of
individual local preference statutes. The market participant excep-
tion should therefore be restated in a manner that ensures that
courts treating local preference statutes will properly account for
such local variation.
II. THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION RESTATED
A. The Private-Party Test
This Comment argues that "market participation" should be
defined as those state actions which could legally be undertaken by
a private party acting in the market. This definition offers courts a
framework more workable than the Supreme Court's regulator/par-
ticipant distinction. Using a private-party test for states' Com-
merce Clause immunity may better prevent states from imposing
conditions "that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that
particular market." 3
Rather than requiring a state to mimic a private party, the
private-party test asks whether a private party could mimic the
state. Under this test, states can choose their trading partners in a
manner as biased-but no more biased-than could private
parties.74
71 Id (emphasis in original). The court also noted that "[a] rule that would consider all
political subdivisions as separate from state control for market participant purposes would
be anomalous to the proposition that political subdivisions exist at the will of the state." Id.
7'2 See Varat, 48 U Chi L Rev at 522 (cited in note 57):
[The Framers] sanctioned a diversity of policies among the states. That diversity inevi-
tably distorts business location and resource allocation decisions from what they would
be in a true free-trade area. The Framers thus compromised to some degree the na-
tional free-trade objectives of the commerce clause in the interest of state power.
71 Wunnicke, 467 US at 97.
7' Note that other doctrines may still govern state action regardless of the outcome of
market participant analysis. See, for example, US v Hagen, 782 F Supp 1351, 1359 (D Neb
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Although previous commentators have focused on the partici-
pant/private party analogy, they have generally underplayed or ig-
nored the restraints on private parties. For example, while Kovacs
and Anderson argue that a state acting. as a market participant
should enjoy "all the freedoms of a private-sector entrepreneur,"
they argue that this principle should be limited by considerations
of "fairness"-hardly a predictable criterion.75
A 1985 Duke Law Journal note presents a slightly different
analysis.7 6 The note advocates a private-party measure of market
participation, with several modifications. It argues that the market
participant exception should encompass only those cases where the
state acts "in the form, and with the intent and impact, of an eco-
nomically rational private market force."' 7 Further, the state
should also be required to show that its preference has "a sound
economic basis, considering the state as a private entity, without
regard to the potential or actual economic benefits to its citi-
zens." The state preference should create an economic benefit
likely to exceed the benefits obtainable from pursuing nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives. e
However, the "sound economic basis"' requirement and the
monitoring of states' intentions advocated in the Duke Law Jour-
nal note are more prescriptive than workable under current condi-
tions. Courts can rarely, if ever, second-guess a legislative determi-
nation that a particular course of action had a "sound economic
basis."80 And where the Court confers market participant status,
even an overtly protectionist motive becomes irrelevant.8 1
1991) ("a regulation or statute may be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge, but
that same regulation may still be held to violate the Privileges & Immunities Clause").
1 Kovacs & Anderson, 18 Envir L at 803 (cited in note 37). Professor Coenen similarly
underplays the relevance of the private-party analogy by burying it within his proposed
four-prong test for the market participant exception. Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Mar-
ket Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 Mich L Rev 395, 421-26,
430-35, 441 (1989).
76 Note, 1985 Duke L J 697 (cited in note 54).
7 Id at 733.
78 Id.
7 Id.
80 See text accompanying notes 52-53.
' See text accompanying notes 54-55. See generally Gey, 17 NYU Rev L and Soc
Change at 64-65 (cited in note 37).
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B. "Participation" and the Antitrust Laws
The private-party test looks to the antitrust laws 2 to ensure
that states do not abuse their market powers in the guise of "mar-
ket participants." It does not, however, substitute antitrust liabil-
ity for dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Instead, the private-
party test refers to antitrust law to help determine when dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny would be appropriate. Under the pri-
vate-party test, if a state takes actions that would violate the anti-
trust laws if undertaken by a private party, the state would be sub-
ject to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Thus, states would be
prevented from using monopoly power or vertical restraints of
trade to achieve the sort of "substantial regulatory effect" forbid-
den by Wunnicke5 s
A number of courts and commentators have already used anti-
trust principles to limit the market participant exception.8 4 For ex-
ample, Justice White relied on an antitrust analogy in holding that
the preference at issue in Wunnicke had an overly "regulatory ef-
fect."8 5 Likewise, in Western Oil and Gas Association v Cory,"e the
Ninth Circuit declined to apply the market participant exception
since California's Lands Commission had "a complete monopoly
over the sites" being leased.8 7
"' Federal antitrust legislation includes the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 USC § 1 et seq
(1988), the Clayton Act, 15 USC § 12 et seq (1988), and the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 USC § 41 et seq (1988).
467 US at 97.
For example, Kovacs and Anderson propose that the market participant exception
should be bounded by considerations of "fairness or evenhandedness." Kovacs and Ander-
son, 18 Envir L at 808 (cited in note 37). To the extent that states can claim antitrust
immunity while acting as market participants, the "fairness" principle would then invoke
the restrictions of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. Otherwise, the authors warn, "the
state as a market participant can provide any service in a manner that eliminates competi-
tion ... ." Id. See also Note, The Delaware Takeover Statute: Constitutionally Infirm Even
Under the Market Participant Exception, 17 Hofstra L Rev 203 (1988). This note argues
that because Delaware occupies a monopoly position in the market for corporate charters,
the Delaware takeover statute should not be treated as a form of market participation. Id at
227-34.
85 467 US at 98-99 ("It is no defense in an action charging vertical trade restraints that
the same end could be achieved through vertical integration .. ").
86 726 F2d 1340 (9th Cir 1984), aff'd mem, 471 US 81 (1985).
8" As the court noted, "[t]he permanency of plaintiff's facilities does not permit them to
'shop around.' There is no other competitor to which they can go for the rental of the re-
quired strip of California coastline." Id at 1343. But compare LeFrancois v Rhode Island,
669 F Supp 1204, 1212 (D RI 1987) (discussing but rejecting a "monopoly exception" to the
market participant doctrine).
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Notably, the doctrine of state action antitrust immunity set
forth in Parker v Brown8 s does not affect the private-party test's
use of antitrust principles to define the scope of the market par-
ticipant exception. The Court has suggested that Parker immunity
does not apply to states acting as market participants. 89 Also, bear
in mind that the Commerce Clause doctrine and the antitrust doc-
trine are independent of one another. Parker immunity reflects the
congressional intent underlying the Sherman Act."' In contrast, the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine reflects the Court's under-
standing of the economic policies underlying the Commerce
Clause.91 Immunity in the antitrust context does not warrant im-
munity in the Commerce Clause context.
The private-party test prevents states from taking advantage
of their Parker immunity to achieve economic protectionism.92
Since private parties cannot create Parker immunity, any state ac-
tion which evades antitrust review under Parker immunity is sim-
ply not defined as "market participation." As a result, such state
- 317 US 341, 350-51 (1943).
"' See Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S Ct 1344, 1351 (1991) (Parker
immunity "does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity but
as a participant in a given market."); Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v Abbott
Laboratories, 460 US 150, 154 (1983) (state action immunity "does not apply where a State
has chosen to compete in the private retail market").
The uncertain scope of state antitrust immunity already prompts state purchasing offi-
cials to guard against antitrust violations. See National Association of Attorneys General &
National Association of State Purchasing Officials, Government Purchasing and the Anti-
trust Laws at 35-38 (Committee on the Office of Attorney General of the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General, 1977) (discussing potential liability for price-fixing, refusal to
deal, exclusive requirement contracting, and bribery). See generally Ann Berkley Rodgers,
The Limits of State Activity in the Interstate Water Market, 21 Land & Water L Rev 357,
379 (1986); L. David Condon, The Never-Ending Story: Low-Level Waste and the Exclu-
sionary Authority of Noncompacting States, 30 Nat Res J 65, 83 (1990).
9' Parker, 317 US at 351-52. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 USC
§§ 34-36 (1988), which immunizes local government entities and officers from damages lia-
bility under the Clayton Act, can be treated in the same manner as Parker immunity. The
Act reflects congressional concern that antitrust damages would "undermine a local govern-
ment's ability to govern in the public interest." Local Government Antitrust Act, HR Rep
No 98-965, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1984), reprinted in 98 USCCAN 4602, 4603 (1984). How-
ever, the Act does not bar suits for injunctive relief. Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v City of
Paragould, 739 F Supp 1314, 1317 (E D Ark 1990). Whatever the scope of the local govern-
ment immunity created by the Act, the immunity does not apply to private parties and
therefore should not be considered when applying the private-party test of market
participation.
91 H.P. Hood & Sons v Du Mond, 336 US 525, 539 (1949) ("Such was the vision of the
Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.").
92 See Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617, 624 (1978) (simple economic protection-
ism subject to "virtually per se rule of invalidity").
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action could have no immunity from dormant Commerce Clause
challenges.
C. The Private-Party Test of "Market Participation" Applied
This Section illustrates how the private-party test could en-
hance market participant exception analysis, by applying the test
to past Supreme Court cases. Like a private party, a state may
choose to buy scrap from whom it likes (Hughes), sell cement to
whom it likes (Reeves), or hire the contractors whom it likes
(White). But, again like a private party, a state may not tell other
parties to have their lumber processed by a particular processor
(Wunnicke).
In Reeves, the Court affirmed South Dakota's policy of giving
residents a priority in sales from the state's cement factory. The
Court itself noted "the long recognized right of a trader or manu-
facturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal." s Unsurprisingly, Reeves then recognized that "the Com-
merce Clause places no limitations on a State's refusal to deal with
particular parties when it is participating in the interstate market
in goods. '94 Nor did any abuses of market power present them-
selves. No entry barriers kept private parties from beginning to
manufacture their own cement; the Court rejected the argument
that South Dakota had supplanted the free market for cement as
both "simplistic and speculative. '9 5
In contrast, the preference at issue in Wunnicke, if pursued by
a private party, could well be characterized as a "classic example of
the tying arrangement."96 The tie appears unlawful since it forced
purchasers to have their lumber resawed in-state even though, ab-
sent the tie, "absolutely no market for domestic resawing" ex-
isted. 7 Thus, the Wunnicke preference does not qualify as "mar-
13 Reeves, Inc. v State, 447 US 429, 438-39 (1980), quoting US v Colgate & Co., 250 US
300, 307 (1919).
'4 South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v Wunnicke, 467 US 82, 94 (1984) (sum-
marizing Reeves).
'5 Reeves, 447 US at 445.
467 US at 102 (Rehnquist dissenting), citing United States Steel Corp. v Fortner
Enterprises, Inc., 429 US 610, 619-21 (1977).
" Wunnicke, 467 US at 86 n 5, citing Joint Appendix at 121a-22a. For the application
of tying theory to market participants, see also Charles H. Clarke, Local Hire and the
State-Market-Participant Doctrine: A Trojan Horse for the Commerce Clause Power of
Congress, 33 Cleve St L Rev 191, 214-15 (1984-85). In general, "the vice of tying arrange-
ments lies in the use of economic power in one market to restrict competition on the merits
in another, regardless of the source from which the power is derived and whether the power
1993]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ket participation." And, falling back on traditional dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, the Court then rejected the preference
as an instance of overt protectionism. e8
III. LocAL PREFERENCE STATUTES AS "PRIVATE-PARTY" ACTION
Under the private-party test, local preference statutes will not
automatically violate the dormant Commerce Clause. A local pref-
erence statute will satisfy the Commerce Clause under two condi-
tions: 1) the preference must be a choice of trading partners that a
private party could make, and 2) the choice must only govern the
state's own transactions. Since local preference statutes impose a
preference on a state's political subdivisions, whether a state can
satisfy the second condition will depend upon the degree of auton-
omy its subdivisions enjoy-a matter of state law.
A. A State May Prefer Its Residents
Generally, a local preference is a choice available to private
parties. A private contractor can choose to "hire local" if it so
desires. Similarly, a private consumer could buy local or "buy
American"-decisions that are commonly made. Consumers may
even organize boycotts if they so desire.99
Against this backdrop, the courts in W.C.M., Trojan, and Big
Country lost little time concluding that the preferences they faced
were generically valid. The Trojan court declared itself "satisfied
that if Pennsylvania is only a participant, the [Commerce Clause]
inquiry is at an end."100 Likewise, the W.C.M. court noted that if
Illinois "had limited the preference law to construction projects fi-
nanced (in whole or in part) or administered by the state, it would
takes the form of a monopoly or not." Northern Pacific Railway Co. v United States, 356
US 1, 11 (1958). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 US 36, 65-66
(1977) (White concurring). For discussion and criticism of this line of cases, see generally
Dominick T. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure 198-225
(John Wiley & Sons, 1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1,
4-14 (1984) (collecting authors).
98 Wunnicke, 467 US at 99 ("Viewed as a naked restraint on export of unprocessed
logs, there is little question that the processing requirement cannot survive scrutiny under
the precedents of the Court.").
9 See, for example, Building and Construction Trades Council v Associated Builders
and Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 1993 US LEXIS 1948, *20-21; Gould,
475 US at 290.
100 Trojan Technologies, Inc. v Pennsylvania, 916 F2d 903, 910 (3d Cir 1990), citing
White, 460 US at 210. See also Big Country Foods, Inc. v Board of Education of Anchorage
School District, 952 F2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir 1992).
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be clear after White that the law did not violate the commerce
clause."101
B. Specific Local Preference Statutes May Be Disguised In-
stances of Improper Market Regulation
Even if a "preference" is valid, the dormant Commerce Clause
may bar the state from imposing the preference on its subdivi-
sions.102 The limitations that apply to private parties-the anti-
trust laws and the inability to engage in traditional regula-
tion-suggest the following principle: private parties may not
impose their market preferences on others. The private-party test
applies this principle to local preference statutes, suggesting that
such statutes will violate the Commerce Clause unless the state
and its subdivisions are the same "participant." Whether this is so
will depend upon the legal relationship between a state and its
subdivisions, a relationship which varies from state to state.
1. Legal relationship of state and subdivision.
Since the status of political subdivisions is a matter of state
law, 03 subdivisions' autonomy may be expected to vary signifi-
cantly. Unless courts make state-specific inquiries in local prefer-
ence statute cases, they must settle for the imprecision of genera-
lized doctrines of local government.'" According to such doctrines,
101 W.C.M. Window Co., Inc. v Bernardi, 730 F2d 486, 495 (7th Cir 1984).
102 States "may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the
movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through
the State itself." Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v Michigan Department of Natural
Resources, 112 S Ct 2019, 2024 (1992).
10' Avery v Midland County, 390 US 474, 480 (1968) ("the forms and functions of local
government and the relationships among the various units are matters of state concern").
See also South Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. v Dade
County, 723 F2d 846, 852 (11th Cir 1984) (extent of political subdivision's power to depart
from competitive bidding practices is a matter of state law).
10" Commentators continue to cite the supremacy of state government over its subdivi-
sions, a theme developed in such cases as Hunter v Pittsburgh, 207 US 161, 178-79 (1907).
See, for example, Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv L Rev 1059, 1062-67,
1105-20 (1980) (arguing that conscious choices in the political process have rendered cities
powerless to solve their own problems). But Professor Williams argues that Professor Frug
has projected his own ideology into the inquiry of the scope of local governmental authority,
arriving at biased conclusions. Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of Amer-
ican Local Government: The Politics of City Status on American Law, 1986 Wis L Rev 83,
150-53.
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political subdivisions are creations of state government whose pow-
ers can be modified or withdrawn at the state's discretion. 10 5
Many states, however, have abrogated the constitutional struc-
ture which underlies* this doctrine.10 And the sheer number and
variety of local government entities-over 80,000 in
19901°0 -strongly suggest that even within a single state, a simple
rule of thumb will not cover all local preference contingencies.
Thus, the blanket assertions characterizing the relationships be-
tween the states and subdivisions in W.C.M., Trojan and Big
Country were inappropriate.10 8 Their cursory treatment of these
state law issues is surprising. Federal courts frequently account for
variations in state local government law in analogous situations,
such as Parker antitrust immunity, Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity and diversity jurisdiction.
a) Antitrust immunity of local governments. Parker im-
munity extends to a state's political subdivisions only when they
act pursuant to a state policy of displacing competition.'0 " The
greater the political subdivision's autonomy, the more specific the
state's authorization of anticompetitive activity must be in order
for Parker immunity to apply to the subdivision.110 This inquiry
205 For example, the Hunter Court affirmed the power of the state to revoke city au-
thority. 207 US at 178-79. See also Atkin v Kansas, 191 US 207, 220-21 (1903) (noting the
power of a state to repeal the charter and destroy the municipal corporation); Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v Mortier, 111 S Ct 2476, 2483 (1991).
108 See Chester J. Antieau, 1 Municipal Corporation Law § 3.00 et seq (Matthew
Bender, 1989) (summarizing the states' efforts to empower their political subdivisions). For
example, see Iowa Const, Art 3, § 38A:
Municipal corporations are granted home rule power and authority, not inconsistent
with the laws of the General Assembly, to determine their local affairs and government
The rule or proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can ex-
ercise only those powers granted in express words is not a part of the law of this state.
Note that at the same time that Iowa abrogated Dillon's rule, it left open the possibility
that state laws will automatically preempt local ordinances "inconsistent with the laws of
the general assembly. . . ." Id.
107 Richard Briffault, Our Localism' Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum L
Rev 346, 348-56 (1990) (noting the disparities between, for example, cities and suburbs).
108 See W.C.M., 730 F2d at 495 ("for many purposes... every local government unit in
Illinois is a part of the state government; but maybe not for the purpose of evaluating Illi-
nois' preference law under the commerce clause"); Big Country, 952 F2d at 1179 ("Political
subdivisions generally exist at the will of the state.").
109 Hallie v Eau Claire, 471 US 34, 39-40 (1985) (summarizing cases).
110 See, for example, Community Communications Co., Inc. v Boulder, 455 US 40, 52-
56 (1982) (home rule grant of power to municipality to govern its local affairs does not
constitute authorization for municipality to restrain competition in the cable industry). This
principle has been criticized. See Note, Municipal Antitrust Immunity After City of
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turns on a construction of state law. A local entity acts as an agent
of the state when the state's grant of authority to act indicates
"that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained
of."111 Subdivisions "must do more than merely produce an au-
thorization to 'do business' to show that the state's policy is to dis-
place competition.111 2
Of course, Parker immunity is not perfectly analogous to the
market participant exception.113 A subdivision can obtain Parker
immunity while remaining an independent entity;114 the state's au-
thorization of an anticompetitive policy does no more than offer
the subdivision an option without requiring the subdivision to pur-
sue the policy. " 5 In contrast, a state cannot constitutionally sub-
ject an independent subdivision to a local preference statute.
b) Other references to state law of local government. The
need to look to state law of local government also has parallels in
the Eleventh Amendment context. For example, Mt. Healthy
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S Ct 1344 (1991), 67 Wash L Rev 479
(1992). This note argues that the Supreme Court's application of the Parker doctrine to
home rule entities takes inadequate account of the fact that "most states have a fairly well-
developed common law circumscribing home rule powers." Id at 500. If this were taken into
account, the note concludes, courts could better assess whether a facially broad grant of
home rule authority foreseeably contemplated the anticompetitive activity at issue. Id.
" Lafayette v Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 US 389, 394 (1978), quoting Lafay-
ette v Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F2d 431, 434 (5th Cir 1976).
'2 Lancaster Community Hospital v Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F2d 397, 403
(9th Cir 1991), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1168 (1992). The Lancaster court withheld antitrust
immunity from a hospital district since its state authorization did not extend to anticompe-
titive activities: "instead of making regulation the order of the day in the hospital service
sector of the economy, [the state had] committed itself to a competitive market." Id.
For sufficient legislative authorization, see, for example, C & A Carbone, Inc. v Clarks-
town, 770 F Supp 848 (S D NY 1991) (treating NY Town Law §§ 130, 198(9), 221 (McKin-
ney 1987 & Supp 1993)). The C & A court found that the "anti-competitive" provisions of
the local law were "the foreseeable result" of "several New York statutes which authorize
local control over the disposal and dumping of local garbage." Id at 851-52.
223 Note that the political-subdivision aspect of Parker immunity is discussed only as
an illustration of federal courts' use of state law of local government. This is not intended to
suggest that the view of local government entities under the Parker doctrine should control
in market participant cases. As discussed in text at notes 88-91, the policies underlying
Parker immunity are wholly distinct from those underlying the dormant Commerce Clause.
1,4 Fuchs v Rural Electric Convenience Cooperative, Inc., 858 F2d 1210, 1214 (7th Cir
1988), citing Hallie v Eau Claire, 471 US 34, 42 (1985) ("The state policy need not compel
the municipality to take the challenged action; it is enough that anticompetitive effects are
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the state's grant of authority.").
"' Indeed, the scope of local entities' Parker immunity is even broader "than what is
applied to determine the legality of the municipality's action under state law." City of Co-
lumbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S Ct 1344, 1350 (1991).
The University of Chicago Law Review
Board of Education v Doyle116 presented the issue whether a local
board of education would be treated as an arm of the State, pro-
tected by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity, or as an in-
dependent political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment
does not extend. The Court based its holding, in part, "upon the
nature of the entity created by state law. 1 17 Because Ohio law ex-
cluded school districts from the "State," no sovereign immunity
attached." 8
The Supreme Court has required the same inquiry for deter-
mining diversity jurisdiction. In Moor v Alameda County,11 the
Court considered whether diversity jurisdiction lay in an action
brought by an Illinois citizen against a California county for inju-
ries suffered when a deputy sheriff wrongfully fired his shotgun.
The Court held that "a political subdivision of a State, unless it is
simply 'the arm or alter ego of the State,' is a citizen of the State
for diversity purposes."120 To determine whether the county could
properly be considered "an arm of the state," the Moor Court con-
ducted a "detailed examination" of California law and found "per-
suasive indicia of the independent status occupied by California
counties relative to the State of California. 1 21
2. Dillon's rule, home rule, and local autonomy.
The relationships between states and their political subdivi-
sions fall along a range between dependence and independence. At
one end of the range, some state laws view political subdivisions as
no more than creations of state government. As such, the subdivi-
sions' powers can be modified or withdrawn at the state's discre-
tion."22 This principle is known as "Dillon's rule. '12 However,
states often depart from Dillon's rule by providing their subdivi-
sions with autonomy over local affairs. Although the degree of au-
116 429 US 274 (1977).
117 Id at 280.
118 Id at 280-81.
119 411 US 693 (1973).
120 Id at 717, quoting State Highway Comm'n of Wyoming v Utah Construction Co.,
278 US 194, 199 (1929).
121 Id at 719-20 (citing the array of powers granted to the county: to sue and be sued,
levy taxes, sell or hold property, provide a variety of public services, and issue bonds). Ala-
meda County argued unsuccessfully that diversity did not exist because Alameda was an
agent of the state, which is not deemed a person for diversity purposes. Id at 696-97.
122 See text accompanying note 105.
11 Dillon's rule takes its name from the 19th century works of John F. Dillon, in partic-
ular his Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations (Cockcroft, 1872). See Williams,
1986 Wis L Rev at 88-100 (cited in note 104).
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tonomy provided varies widely from state to state, the grant of this
autonomy is generally labelled home rule.
Where Dillon's rule governs a state's relations with its subdivi-
sions, the private-party test would suggest that a local preference
statute does not violate the Commerce Clause. When political sub-
divisions are deemed mere creatures of the state, purchases made
by political subdivisions become, effectively, the purchases of the
state-not the purchases of autonomous entities. As the Trojan
court noted, in such cases the suppliers for a local public entity
could be thought of as "supplying for the state."12
Home rule provisions mitigate the effects of Dillon's rule by
empowering subdivisions to manage their own local affairs, free of
interference from the state legislature.125 Home rule serves two
purposes: it is a source of local authority, and it may limit the
power of the state legislature over its subdivisions. 126 By 1989,
thirty-seven states had adopted some form of home rule, 127 and
these provisions bring specific state/subdivision relationships into
sharp focus. The variance among states' home rule regimes defeats
any generalizations regarding local preference statutes. In addition,
the presence of a home rule provision will not, by itself, guarantee
local autonomy; such provisions can be nullified through actual us-
age. 28 To assess whether a matter is of statewide interest or falls
within the scope of local affairs requires a fact-specific, state-by-
state analysis. 29
Under this approach, an out-of-state plaintiff can successfully
challenge a political subdivision's adherence to a local preference
statute only in those cases where the subdivision itself could suc-
cessfully challenge the statute as a violation of its home rule status
124 Trojan, 916 F2d at 911. See also Big Country, 952 F2d at 1179 ("a state should not
be penalized for exercising its power through smaller, localized units").
125 For a description and discussion of home rule provisions generally, see Antieau, 1
Municipal Corporation Law §§ 3.00 et seq (cited in note 106).
"22 Id § 3.01. Home rule may arise in any of 3 ways: a self-executing constitutional
provision which designates the authority to manage local affairs as a power inherent in lo-
calities; a statutory grant of local home rule power; or the local adoption of a home rule
charter pursuant to a state constitution. Id §§ 3.01-3.03(1).
22 Id § 3.00.
128 See Comment, One Century of Constitutional Home Rule: A Progress Report? 64
Wash L Rev 155, 159-72 (1989) (despite constitutional and statutory provisions for home
rule, Washington municipalities lack meaningful local autonomy); George D. Vaubel, To-
wards Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule,
20 Stetson L Rev 5, 30 (1990) (legislative grant of home rule power "is almost a contradic-
tion in terms").
2 See Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10
Wm & Mary L Rev 269, 281-83 (1968) (noting the variability of home rule laws).
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under state law.130 Moreover, if a home rule entity is properly con-
sidered an arm of the state for purposes of market participant
analysis, so, too, should any other political subdivisions vested with
lesser authority. The impact of local preference statutes on home
rule entities thus provides a convenient test for determining
whether a local preference statute should be seen as market partic-
ipation, or as a form of regulation.13 1 Here, the home rule provi-
sions of the states at issue in W.C.M., Trojan, and Big Country are
considered in turn.
In W.C.M., Judge Posner argued that "[t]he difference be-
tween the state's preferring state residents in its own dealings and
forcing local agencies to do so in theirs is both analytical and quan-
titative." 3 2 Since the state had imposed a preference on "a unit of
local government without any state financial support or supervi-
sion," and the bulk of public contracting takes place at the local
level,'3 3 Posner withheld market participant status.
However, Illinois law supports a different result. In People ex
rel Bernardi v Highland Park,3 4 the Illinois Supreme Court sug-
gested that the Illinois preference statute superseded the local au-
tonomy of home rule entities. Highland Park concerned a home
rule municipality's attempt to skirt the requirements of the state-
wide Prevailing Wage Act. The court held that since the Act ad-
dressed "statewide" issues, "Highland Park's attempt to abrogate
the prevailing wage law was an act ultra vires, being outside the
grant of home rule power .... " 5 Instead, "Highland Park had no
choice but to comply with the statute's requirements.' 3 6 In deter-
mining that the Prevailing Wage Act was a matter of statewide
concern, the Highland Park court drew an analogy to the Illinois
130 Of course, if this challenge fails, the out-of-state plaintiff 'might still prevail by
showing the preference policy to be generically invalid. See Section llI.A.
"'1 See Doreen J. Piligian, Resident Preference Laws and the Award of Public Con-
tracts, 10 Construc L 10 (May 1990). Piligian notes that while political subdivisions have
been described as "mere creatures of the state," many are in fact governed by home rule
charters. Id at 23. In such cases, Piligian asserts, local preference statutes may restrain local
decisionmaking and burden local funds-a form of regulation rather than market participa-
tion. Id. However, a more detailed analysis is required since, as argued above, home rule
provisions in fact provide highly variable degrees of.local autonomy.
132 730 F2d at 496.
13 Id.
134 121 IMI 2d 1, 15-17, 520 NE2d 316, 322-23 (1988).
135 Id at 16.
136 Id at 5.
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local preference statute, which, the court found, also addressed
statewide issues.
Reconsidering W.C.M. in light of Highland Park, it appears
that the Illinois Preference Act left the state's subdivisions no
power to contract in any way other than in conformance with the
Preference Act. In other words, the municipality acted not as an
independent actor subject to an imposed preference, but rather as
an arm of the state. Under this view, the Preference Act should
have been upheld.
In disagreeing with W.C.M., the Trojan court relied princi-
pally on its assessment of local autonomy. Under Pennsylvania
law, "the local bodies covered by the statute exist only by grace of
state authority . ".. ,,'Is The court saw "no reason why, attendant
on making such affirmative grants of authority, the Commonwealth
may not also restrict the contracting power of such local bodies."1"9
No basis remained to distinguish preferences imposed on central
state agencies-which "certainly would be permitted"-from simi-
lar restrictions imposed on local bodies. °
Reference to Pennsylvania's home rule provisions buttresses
the soundness of the Trojan court's holding. Under the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution, "[a] municipality which has a home rule charter
may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this
Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly
at any time."'14 This language designates the scope of home rule
authority but also permits the state legislature to control local af-
fairs by passing acts which affect both general and local concerns.
This weak form of local autonomy supports the Trojan court's
readiness to view localities as simple arms of the state for purposes
of the preference statute. Indeed, the court cited Pennsylvania
137 Id at 14, citing Illinois Preference Act, Ill Rev Stat, ch 48 T 269 et seq (1985). The
Highland Park court observed that:
Were home rule authorities allowed to govern their local labor conditions, the [Illinois]
Constitution's vision of home rule units exercising their powers to solve local problems
would be corrupted and that power used to create a confederation of modem feudal
estates which, to placate local economic and political expediencies, would in time de-
stroy the General Assembly's carefully crafted and balanced economic policies. It is
precisely for this reason, to avoid a chaotic and ultimately ineffective labor policy, that
the State has a far more vital interest in regulating labor conditions than do local
communities.
Id at 16.
I" Trojan, 916 F2d at 911.
13 Id.
140 Id.
" Pa Const, Art IX, § 2.
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cases detailing the subordinate status of local subdivisions.142 In
sum, the court held that the suppliers of local subdivisions were in
effect "supplying for the state. 143
In Big Country, the Ninth Circuit followed Trojan, holding
that'a state preference statute controlling the purchases of local
school districts fell within the market-participant exception. 144
However, the Big Country court paid only cursory attention to the
issue of local government law presented by the case before it. Ar-
guing that political subdivisions "exist at the will of the state," the
court chose to view them as simple arms of the state for purposes
of market participant analysis.1 45
Notably, the Big Country court reached its holding without
any reference to Alaska law. Instead, the court relied on another
Ninth Circuit case dealing with California law, Trojan, and a horn-
book on local government which mentioned the general rule of
"complete control" by various states over their subdivisions. 46
That the court was satisfied by this authority reflects its reluctance
to look to Alaska law to determine the actual status of the school
board.'17 Yet had it done so, the Big Country court could have fur-
nished a more robust basis for its holding.
The Alaska Constitution provides that home rule boroughs or
cities "may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law or
by charter.'1 48 This apparently broad language is in practice tem-
pered by the facility with which legislative powers may be removed
from the cities. The Supreme Court of Alaska has held that even a
broad construction of home rule powers cannot defeat the provi-
sions of a state statute "expressly made applicable to home rule
municipalities ....
142 Trojan, 916 F2d at 911 n 15. For Pennsylvania law, the Trojan court rested on, for
example, Department of Public Welfare v Adams County, 30 Pa Commw 164, 373 A2d 143,
145 n 4 (1977), rev'd on other grounds 481 Pa 230, 392 A2d 692 (1977); Plum Township
Annexation Case, 178 Pa Super 376, 116 A2d 260 (1955).
143 916 F2d at 911.
144 952 F2d at 1179.
145 Id ("A state should not be penalized for exercising its power through smaller, local-
ized units.").
140 Id, citing City of Inglewood v City of Los Angeles, 451 F2d 948, 954 (9th Cir 1971);
Trojan, 916 F2d at 911; Osborne M. Reynolds, Local Government Law §§ 27, 174 (1982 &
Supp 1990).
147 The Big Country court noted its reluctance to adopt a rule that would require "diffi-
cult case-specific inquiries into the degree of subdivision autonomy." 952 F2d at 1179.
148 Alaska Const, Art X, § 11.
1'49 Alaska v Petersburg, 538 P2d 263, 268-69 (Alaska 1975). The statute at issue in
Petersburg provided that it was "applicable to organized boroughs and political subdivisions
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Indeed, the Alaska preference statute considered in Big Coun-
try singled out schools receiving state funds, requiring that they
observe a local preference when buying dairy products. 15 0 In the
face of such specificity, the school boards' autonomy and delegated
power fell away, as envisioned by the Alaska constitution. Thereaf-
ter, the subdivisions in question served as arms of the state for
purchasing purposes.
The disagreement among these cases is not so much a "split"
on the meaning of the market participant exception, but the result
of the difficulty in applying the exception. Lacking firmly-estab-
lished criteria for applying the exception, the courts have adopted
inconsistent approaches. By encouraging courts to give proper con-
sideration to the inherent variations in state law, the private-party
test provides a more reliable basis for evaluating local preference
statutes.
Although, under the private-party test, the local preference
statutes at issue in W.C.M., Trojan, and Big Country all appear
valid, this does not mean that home rule provisions present no ob-
stacle to the validity of local preference statutes. For example, the
California Constitution provides that home rule municipalities
shall have autonomous control over "municipal affairs. ' 15 Under
California law, "municipal affairs" include "[tihe expenditure of a
city's funds on [public works] projects and the rates of pay of the
workers whom it hires to carry them out," at least where such
projects are not "considered to be of State concern" and do not
involve the expenditure of state or federal funds.1 5 - This concep-
tion suggests, at a minimum, that California could not impose a
local preference statute on home rule entities undertaking self-fi-
nanced public works projects.
CONCLUSION
Under a private-party definition of market participation,
states enjoy immunity from the dormant Commerce Clause only
when acting in a manner that could legally be undertaken by a
private actor in the market. Reference to private action ensures
of the state, home rule or otherwise . . . ." 1972 Alaska Sess Laws ch 113, § 4 ("An Act
relating to wages, hours and working arrangements").
150 Alaska Stat § 36.15.050(a) (1992).
151 Cal Const Art XI, § 5, as explained by Vial v San Diego, 122 Cal App 3d 346, 348,
175 Cal Rptr 647, 648 (1981).
251 Vial v San Diego, 122 Cal App 3d at 348, citing City of Pasadena v Charleville, 215
Cal 384, 392, 10 P2d 745, 750 (1932).
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that states cannot use the exception indirectly to impose restraints
on commerce which would be barred if imposed directly. At the
same time, the private-party test allows states an avenue to meet
the parochial demands inevitably placed upon them.
Applied to local preference statutes, the private-party model
prompts two questions. First, the preference should be evaluated
at a generic level. Unless a private party could have exercised such
a preference, the dormant Commerce Clause must be applied. Sec-
ond, state law should be examined to determine whether the state
and its subdivisions can properly be considered the same actor. In
this capacity, home rule provisions can provide a convenient test of
subdivisions' actual level of autonomy.
Application of the private-party test demonstrates that the va-
lidity of local preference statutes under the dormant Commerce
Clause depends in large part on individual states' law of local gov-
ernment. A state may impose a local preference if the state keeps
its subdivisions reined in, but not if it has cut them a lot of slack.
In turn, this conclusion implies that by amending their law of local
government, states could reduce the federal constitutional obsta-
cles to their ability to act in the market.
